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Comments
Fraud on the Patent Office: A Source
of Antitrust Litigation
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery and Chemical
Corp.,' and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in American
Cyanamid Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,2 holding that fraud on
the Patent Office may give rise to a hazard of liability under Section
2 of the Sherman Act3 and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act,4 raise several questions. It is the function of this paper to inquire
into Patent Office procedure as it relates to possibilities for fraudulent
conduct, and then to consider the nature of fraud as it relates to the
Patent Office and the evidentiary standards under both antitrust acts.
Finally, the antitrust aspects of these decisions and possible actions
that can be brought thereunder will be explored. At the outset a brief
review of the development of fraud on the Patent Office will provide a
basis for the more specific discussion which follows.
DEVELOPMENT
In 1872, the Supreme Court stated in Mowry v. Whitney5 that only
the United States could sue for cancellation of a patent procured by
fraud. This position was reiterated in United States v. American Bell
Tel. Co.6 in 1897. Earlier, in 1869, the Court held that the defendant
could not raise fraud in the procurement of a patent as a defense to an
infringement suit.7 However, in 1933, in Keystone Driller Co. v. General
Excavator Co.," the patentee's active suppression of prior use, which
clouded the validity of his patent, was held sufficient to deny relief from
1. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
2. 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964). For text see infra note 49.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
5. 81 U.S. 434 (1872).
6. 167 U.S. 224 (1897).
7. The Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. 828 (1870).
8. 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
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infringement under the equitable doctrine of "unclean hands." Hazel-
Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co.," decided in 1944, denied relief
against infringement on grounds of fraud where the patentee used an
article written by his attorney and published in a trade journal, pur-
portedly authored by an expert, to overcome objections of the Patent
Office. In Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance
Machinery Co.,'0 another infringement action, relief was denied due
to the false character of statements presented to the Patent Office per-
taining to the conception of the invention and its reduction to practice.
An interference was subsequently settled and the patents issued. The
Court held that plaintiff had unclean hands and could not recover.
The Court stated:
A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest.
[A] patent is an exception to the general rule against monopolies
and to the right to access to a free and open market. The far-
reaching social and economic consequences of a patent, therefore,
give the public a paramount interest in seeing that patent mo-
nopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequi-
table conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their
legitimate scope."
The most recent Supreme Court case considering fraud on the Patent
Office is Walker Process Equipment Co. v. Food Machinery and Chem-
ical Corp.'2 FMC brought suit for infringement of its patent on swing-
action diffusers used in sewage treatment systems. Denying the infringe-
ment, Walker counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the
patent was invalid and further counterclaimed that FMC had violated
Section 2 of the Sherman Act by obtaining the patent through fraud;
Walker prayed for treble damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.
Walker alleged that FMC had falsely sworn that its invention had not
been in prior use for more that one year prior to filing the patent
application" when in fact FMC knew that it had. The District Court
dismissed the counterclaim. The Court of Appeals affirmed 4 on the
9. 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
10. 324 U.S. 806 (1945). For a general discussion fraud on the Patent Office see, Joel,
Fraud in the Procurement of a Patent, 49 J.P.O.S. 596 (1967); Keaveney, Fraud in the
Procurement of a Patent as a Defense to Infringement, 33 J.P.O.S. 482 (1951).
11. 324 U.S. at 816.
12. 382 U.S. 172 (1965). Walker Process Equipment Co. hereinafter referred to as
Walker. Food Machinery and Chemical Corp. hereinafter referred to as FMC.
13. This oath is required by the Patent office Rules of Practice. 37 C.F.R. § 1.65 (1967).
14. Walker Process Equipment Co. v. Food Machinery and Chemical Corp., 335 F.2d
315 (7th Cir. 1964).
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theory that while fraud on the Patent Office could be used as an equi-
table defense to infringement, it could not be used affirmatively, because
only the United States can sue for cancellation of a patent 15 and since
fraud cannot be the basis for a declaratory judgment action to have a
patent declared invalid. 16
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that fraud on the Patent Office
may violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act provided that the other
elements of a Section 2 case are present. Conceding that only the United
States can sue to cancel a patent, the Court reasoned that Walker's
counterclaim did not seek cancellation of the patent since Walker's
theory was that a fraudulently procured patent should not enjoy im-
munity from the antitrust laws. The Court asserted that allowing
Walker's counterclaim was consonant with the long recognized practices
of: allowing the defendant in an infringement action to assert the
patent's invalidity;17 allowing the validity of a patent to be tested
under the Declaratory Judgment Act; 8 and that patent misuse subjects
the patentee to civil antitrust suits.19 The Court also noted that such
a rule would be in keeping with the public interest of insuring that
patents spring from backgrounds free from fraud. 20
In 1958 the Federal Trade Commission 21 charged Charles Pfizer
and Co.22 and American Cyanamid Co. 23 with an unlawful combination
in restraint of trade in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act. The complaint stated that Pfizer had made misleading
and inaccurate statements to the Patent Office and had withheld
material information with the intent to induce issuance of a patent on
the antibiotic tetracycline. The patent examiner made an initial rejec-
tion of the Cyanamid application on the ground that there was a pos-
sibility that tetracycline had been produced in the process used for the
production of Aureomycin under patents then held by Cyanamid. Cyana-
mid then filed a statement with the Patent Office stating that it was not
15. Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. 434 (1872).
16. E. W. Bliss Co. v. Cold Metal Process Co., 102 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1939).
17. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324
U.S. 806 (1945).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2201-2 (1964). See Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O Two Fire Equipment Co.,
342 U.S. 180 (1952). Apparently an action cannot be maintained for a declaratory judgment
of patent invalidity on grounds of fraud, E. W. Bliss Co. v. Cold Metal Process Co., supra
note 16; Anderson, Antitrust Law Violations Possible From Application of the Doctrine
of Unclean Hands to Conduct During the Procurement of a Patent, 49 J.P.O.S. 117 (1967).
19. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
20. 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
21. Hereinafter referred to as the FTC.
22. Hereinafter referred to as Pfizer.
23. Hereinafter referred to as Cyanamid.
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possible that tetracycline was produced in the Aureomycin process. When
Pfizer filed its application for tetracycline the examiner declared an
interference for the purpose of determining priority. The interference
was discontinued, Cyanamid conceding priority to Pfizer, pursuant
to an unpublicized private settlement agreement between the parties.24
The agreement provided that the parties would cross license each other
regardless of priority determination. Subsequently, adhering to his
former position, the patent examiner rejected the product claims for
tetracycline. However, the examiner stated he would withdraw his
rejection if Pfizer could show that tetracycline was not produced in
recoverable amounts from the Aureomycin process. Pfizer had con-
ducted experiments attempting to recover tetracycline and found that
from two to five per cent of the product of the Aureomycin process was
tetracycline. Pfizer then submitted affidavits to the Patent Office stating
that less than ten per cent of the product of the Aureomycin process was
tetracycline. The examiner withdrew his rejection and the patent for
tetracycline was issued. Pfizer and Cyanamid used the product patent
and threats of suit to develop a market for the antibiotic which grossed
approximately $100 million per year.
The FTC hearing examiner rejected all counts of the FTC's com-
plaint. The Commission reversed the hearing examiner and found that
Pfizer and Cyanamid were guilty of inequitable conduct before the
Patent Office and ordered compulsory licensing of Pfizer's tetracycline
patent at a two and one-half per cent royalty. 25 The Court of Appeals,
having jurisdiction under Section 5 of the FTC Act,26 held that the
FTC had jurisdiction to inquire into possible Section 5 violations where
restraints of trade may have resulted from improper conduct before
the Patent Office and the subsequent use of the patent, and, that, where
such violations existed, the FTC had power to order compulsory
licensing at a fixed royalty. The decision below was reversed on the
ground that the Commission's findings were not supported by sub-
stantial evidence.2 T
The reasoning of Circuit Judge Phillips closely paralleled that of the
Supreme Court in Walker Process. In arriving at the decision he stated
24. 35 U.S.C. § 135(c) (1964), was added in 1962, to require filing of any agreement
between the parties to an interference proceeding with the Patent Office. Failure to file
renders the agreement and any patent subsequently issued invalid.
25. See, Comment, Improperly Procured Patents: FTC Jurisdiction and Remedial
Power, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1505 (1964).
26. American Cyanamid Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
27. Id. at 771, 772. An additional ground for reversal, not herein relevant, was the
disqualification of a Commissioner.
11.0
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that Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act vests in the Com-
mission broad jurisdiction over unfair methods of competition 28 and
noted that public interest demands that patents spring from origins
free from fraud.29 Since it is established that fraudulent conduct in
Patent Office proceedings can give rise to antitrust and FTC action,
an examination of possibilities for fraudulent conduct in Patent Office
procedure follows.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR FRAUD IN PATENT PROCEDURE
Since proceedings before the Patent Office are ex parte and the Patent
Office maintains no investigatory staff, the examiner must rely in the
main on the representations made by the applicant in deciding the
patentability of an invention. This may make possible fraudulent mis-
representations to the examiner which could take the form of false
statements in affidavits and applications. The following is a brief
summary of the statements required of an applicant.
A person filing an application for the grant of a patent is statutorily
required to swear that he believes himself to be the original and first
inventor.30 The Rules of Practice of the Patent Office further require
the applicant to state that he does not know and does not believe that
the invention was ever known or used before his invention or discovery.
In every original application the applicant must state that, to the best
of his knowledge and belief, the invention has not been in public
use or on sale in the United States more than one year prior to his
application. He must further swear that the invention has not been
patented or described in any publication before his invention for more
than one year prior to his application.31 The allegation of falsity with
respect to the oath was the source of the Walker Process controversy.
The Rules also provide for change of inventorship by amending the
application.3 2 This requires an oath or declaration. When applying
for a reissue patent based upon the invalidity of the original patent the
applicant must by oath or declaration assert that the defects of the
original patent arose without any deceptive intention.33
28. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 344 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 939 (1966).
29. 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 115 (1964).
31. 37 C.F.R. § 1.65 (1967). For alternative to oath see, 37 C.F.R. § 1.68 (1967), and
for supplemental oath see, 37 C.F.R. § 1.67 (1967).
32. 37 C.F.R. § 1.45 (1967).
33. 37 C.F.R. § 1.175 (1967).
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Once the examiner has rejected a claim of an application, the ap-
plicant is permitted to file an affadavit showing facts overcoming the
basis for rejection or distinguishing the objections of the examiner.34
The Rules of Practice allow similar procedures for the filing of affa-
davits in conjunction with interference proceedings 5 False statements
submitted with respect to this procedure were at issue in the FTC's
action against Pfizer and Cyanamid.
The foregoing briefly summarizes the duties of the applicant pre-
scribed by rule and statute, but the courts have imposed other duties.
In the Precision Instrument case the Court stated:
Those who have applications pending with the Patent Office or
who are parties to Patent Office proceedings have an uncompromis-
ing duty to report to it all facts concerning possible fraud or
inequitableness underlying the applications in issue. . . . Public
interest demands that all facts relevant to such matters be sub-
mitted to the Patent Office, ... 36
Somewhat unclear is whether the applicant must disclose to the
Patent Office all prior art or publications related to his claimed in-
vention. The present state of the law appears to be set forth in United
States v. Standard Electric Time Co.37 where Judge Wyzanski said that
an applicant has an affirmative duty to disclose any publication which
describes his invention so closely that every reasonable man would say
that his invention was not original but anticipated, regardless of the
applicant's personal judgement. However, an applicant is not required
to cite every publication relevant to his claimed invention.38
SUBSTANTIVE FRAUD AND STANDARD OF PROOF
It appears to be well settled that fraud in patent litigation is com-
posed of the same elements and is subject to the same degree of proof
as in an equitable action for rescission of contract. The party asserting
fraud must show by clear and convincing proof that the other party,
knowingly and with intent to deceive, made a false representation of
material fact which was acted upon by the other party who reasonably
34. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.131 & 1.132 (1967).
35. 37 C.F.R. § 1.201 et. seq., (1967).
36. 324 U.S. at 818.
37. 155 F. Supp. 949 (D. Mass. 1957), appeal dismissed, 254 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1958).
38. Id. at 952; accord, Wen Products v. Portable Electric Tools, Inc., 367 F.2d 764
(7th Cir. 1966); Dubuque Products, Inc. v. Lemco Corp., 227 F. Supp. 108 (D. Utah 1963).
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believed that it was true.39 These standards have been uniformly ap-
plied in cases where the United States has sued for cancellation of a
patent 40 and in cases where fraud has been alleged as a defense to
infringement. 41
In Walker Process, Mr. Justice Clark stated that proof of Walker's
assertion that the patent had been granted because FMC had "know-
ingly and willfully" misrepresented facts to the Patent Office would
make FMC subject to the antitrust laws, but that good faith or honest
mistake would be a complete defense.42 Whether by design or inadver-
tence omitted from the Court's opinion was the requirement that the
facts misrepresented be "material." Concurring, Mr. Justice Harlan
attempted to clarify the holding of the Court using the language "know-
ing and willful fraud" and "deliberate fraud. '43 A District Court has
interpreted the Court's opinion to include the requirement that the
misrepresentation must be of a material fact to sustain a counterclaim
for treble damages under the Sherman Act.44 It is submitted that the
District Court's inference was correct first because it establishes a uni-
form standard for assertions of fraud in patent suits and further it
would be anomalous and confusing to apply a different standard to
suits brought by the United States for cancellation of a patent and those
brought by a private claimant under the anti-trust laws.
Of greater interest is the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in American Cyanamid. There the Court felt constrained
by the statutory requirement that the Commission's findings must be
upheld if supported by substantial evidence. 45 The Commission was
reversed on the ground that its findings were not supported by sub-
stantial evidence, because there was no showing that the patent ex-
aminer had been misled by Pfizer's or Cyanamid's statements.
This raises the interesting possibility of the application of different
evidentiary standards in actions involving fraud on the Patent Office.
39. Southern Development Co. v. Silva, 125 U.S. 247 (1888); United States v. American
Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224 (1897); United States v. Cold Metal Process Co., 62 F. Supp.
127 (N.D. Ohio 1945), aff'd, 164 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 811 (1948).
40. 167 U.S. 224 (1897); 62 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Ohio 1945), aff'd, 164 F.2d 754 (6th Cir.
1947), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 811 (1948).
41. National Dairy Products Corp. v. Borden Co., 261 F. Supp. 771 (D. Wis. 1966);
Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Systems Co., 169 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.
Pa. 1958), aff'd per curiam, 268 F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 894 (1959).
42. 382 U.S. at 177.
43. Id. at 179, 180.
44. Corning Glass Works v. Anchor-Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del.
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 374 F.2d 473 (3d Cir. 1967); accord, Waterman-Bic Pen
Corp. v. W. A. Shaeffer Pen Co., 267 F. Supp. 849 (D. Del. 1967).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1964); 344 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 939 (1966).
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In actions outside the FTC the standard of proof for fraud is said to be
clear and convincing. Section 5 of the FTC Act states that a Court of
Appeals must uphold the Commission's decision if its findings are
supported by substantial evidence which indicates that this standard
is the one to be applied by the Federal Trade Commission. Thus the
FTC by using what appears to be a lesser standard of proof could use
its remedial powers to proscribe conduct where the evidence might not
support an action for common law fraud. Realizing that the distinction
could be said to be largely semantical, the application of different evi-
dentiary standards remains a possibility. The Commission apparently
recognized this possibility, but was unwilling to test the point. For,
in its decision subsequent to remand from the Court of Appeals, based
upon the patent examiner's testimony that he would have rejected the
patent application had he known of the facts suppressed, the Com-
mission enunciated a dual basis for its holding.46 First, it affirmed its
original decision which had characterized Pfizer's conduct as inequit-
able,47 but it held in the alternative that the evidence is clear and con-
vincing that Pfizer had obtained its patent through fraud.48
ANTITRUST ASPECTS
Sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act4 9 generally declare as illegal,
conspiracies in restraint of trade, monopolization and attempts to
monopolize. While the criminal sanctions are set forth in the text of
46. American-Cyanamid Co., 3 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 18,077, 20,504 at 20,512 (FTC
1967).
47. Id. at 20:505, 20,519.
48. Id. at 20,519. In its latest appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
Pfizer contended that the evidentiary standard to be utilized should be that the findings
must be supported by evidence that is clear, unequivocal and convincing and not the
substantial evidence test. Although the Court stated that it could conclude that the find-
ings of the Commission were supported by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence,
it adhered to its prior holding that the findings need only be supported by substantial
evidence. Chas. Pfizer & Co., Inc. v. FTC, 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 72,580, 86,008 at
86,015 (6th Cir. 1968).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964):
Every contract, combination .... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations is hereby declared to be illegal.
... Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or con-
spiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and,
on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars,
or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both....
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964): 1
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, oi
by both....
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the acts, Section 4 of the Clayton Act50 and Section 16 of the Clayton
Act 5 allow private parties who are injured because of violations of the
antitrust laws to sue for treble damages and injunctive relief. Because
the language of the Sherman Act is broad and general, the conduct
proscribed by it has been developed judicially.
Since Walker Process exposed fraud on the Patent Office as a possible
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, that section will be con-
sidered first. The Court stated that a Section 2 violation may result
provided the other elements of a Section 2 violation are present.5 2
Section 2 is concerned with monopolization and attempts to monopolize.
A monopoly has been defined as the power to exclude competition
coupled with an intent and purpose to exclude 53 within the relevant
market. It follows then that the court's definition of relevant market is
the critical element. No single definition could suffice. 54 Since the Court
characterized Walker's claim against the FTC as based upon a per se
violation,55 and since the grant of a monopoly is the grant of the "power
to exclude,"5' 6 it is clear that the Court had the opportunity to define a
single patent as the relevant market and hence a monopoly, the fraudu-
lent procurement of which would supply the intent and purpose to
exclude, and thus violate Section 2. The court did not take this oppor-
tunity to so define the patent grant, but recognized that there may be
effective substitute products57 outside of the patent, and that without
a definition of relevant market FMC's competitive power could not be
assessed. The court also noted that it was reluctant to extend the area
of per se illegality without examination of market and economic con-
siderations. 58 It is submitted that the Court's approach should continue
50. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964).
52. 382 U.S. at 174.
53. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948). See also, United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
Intent and purpose to exclude is generally inferred from some predatory trade practice.
See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Amrica, 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945); Siegel,
Patent Monopoly and Sherman Act Monopolization, 49 J.P.O.S. 67, 79 (1967).
54. The definition of relevant market appears to be largely a matter for judicial deter-
mination based upon such factors as the geographic area of product distribution, the
number of competitors and competing products, the economic structure of the industry,
etc. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &: Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra note 51.
55. 382 U.S. at 178.
56. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1964).
57. See supra note 54. Inclusion of substitute products relates directly to the definition
of the relevant market.
58. 382 U.S. at 178, White Motor Co. v. United States 372 U.S. 253 (1963). But see,
United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), where the Court did extend
the per se violations to include those alleged in White Motor.
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to be used in this class of cases.-a While it can be argued that the grant
of a patent is the grant of a monopoly, certainly very few of the patents
issued ever become so commercially successful as to be able to foreclose
competition from related products. For those few that do achieve such
commercial success the required proof of power to exclude competition
within relevant market should not be too difficult to establish.
It is important to distinguish between monopolizations and attempt
to monopolize under Section 2. Where monopoly is alleged a general
intent to exclude competition must be proved.60 Where attempt to
monopolize is at issue it is necessary to show specific intent to monopo-
lize coupled with a dangerous probability that monopolization will
result.61 In Walker Process the Court indicated that an examination of
the economic consequences within the relevant market was also
needed. 62 In the case of fraud on the Patent Office an interesting pos-
sibility presents itself. If a competitor knows that a fraudulent applica-
tion for a patent has been filed, the granting of which will have a
serious economic impact on the market, it appears that under the hold-
ing of Walker Process, the applicant could be enjoined from prosecut-
ing his patent under Section 16 of the Clayton Act for a violation of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act as an attempt to monopolize.6 3
Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares contracts, combinations and
conspiracies in restraint of trade unlawful. Although the Court in
Walker Process had no occasion to reach the question whether a con-
spiracy to obtain a patent through fraud would violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, its rationale for allowing the bringing of suit under
Section 2 would apply equally well to Section 1.
Under Section 1 the law of conspiracy is the same as common law
conspiracy.6 4 Certain kinds of activity are absolutely proscribed as per
se violations, e.g., price-fixing.6 5 For those violations which fall outside
the per se category the "rule of reason" applies. This involves a judicial
determination of all relevant factors to determine the reasonableness
59. Wood, Antitrusts v. Patents, 21 RECORD 625 (1966); Note Considerations in Patent
Litigation, 9 So. TEX. L.J. 9 (1967); 34 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 540 (1965); 44 TEX. L. Rzv.
1024 (1965).
60. United States v. Griffith, supra note 53.
61. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). Specific intent was shown
where a publisher forced advertisers to boycott a radio station in an attempt to regain
its former monopoly position.
62. 382 U.S. at 177.
63. Similar injunctive action would be available to the government. 15 U.S.C. § 4
(1964).
64. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, n.59 at 224 (1940).
65. Id. at 228.
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of the alleged restraint of trade.66 Because the Court has indicated
reluctance to extend the area of per se illegality, 67 it seems likely that at
least initially the Court will apply the "rule of reason" to conspiracies to
obtain patents by fraud. However, because a patent procured through
fraud is a fraud on the public and does carry with it, at least until the
fraud is exposed, the power to exclude, a determination that a con-
spiracy to obtain a patent through fraud is a per se violation of Section
1 would not be unsupported in reason.
Assuming that such conspiracies are violative of Section 1, in what
types of situations would they arise? Under the antitrust laws, sub-
sidiaries of a common parent can conspire 68 and a parent corporation
can conspire with a subsidiary.69 The District Court of Hawaii has held
that unincorporated divisions of a corporation are capable of conspir-
ing.70 Given these possibilities then similar conspiracies to commit
fraud on the Patent Office would violate Section 1. In addition to and
notwithstanding the statute declaring invalid patents granted pursuant
to private interference settlements not filed with the Patent Office, 7'
conspiracies or agreements conceding priority of invention not filed
would likewise appear to come within Section 1.
Both Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act provide criminal penalties
of one year imprisonment and for a $50,000 fine for every person
found guilty of violating the act.7 2 The Supreme Court in United States
v. Wise 73 stated that a corporate officer is subject to prosecution under
66. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Wood, ANTI-
TRUsS V. PATENTS, supra note 59.
67. See supra note 58.
68. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951). In this
case the subsidiaries held themselves out as competitors to the public.
69. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v.
Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
70. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 915
(D. Hawaii 1967), noted in 6 DUQUESNE U. L. REv. 157 (1967), 36 FoRDHAM L. REV. 607
(1968), 43 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 786 (1968), 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 172 (1968), 21 VAND. L. REv.
375 (1968), and 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 223 (1968).
71, 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1964).
72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964). In addition the antitrust law imposes similar liability on
corporate officers or directors who participate in a violation of the antitrust laws by the
corporation, although the fine imposed is only $5,000, 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1964). Other criminal
sanctions are imposed for false swearing before administrative agencies of the United
States, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964); Mas v. United States, 151 F.2d 32 (D.C. Cir. 1945), was a
prosecution for filing a false deposition and for uttering false documents before the
Patent Office.
For a criminal action which arose with respect to the tetracycline patent see, United
States v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 45,061 (case 1622) (1967), in which
Pfizer and Cyanamid et al., were convicted of violating the Sherman Act. Charges were
also brought against the chief executives of the corporations, but they were later with-
drawn.
73. 370 U.S. 405 (1962).
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Section 1 whenever he knowingly participates in effecting an illegal
contract "regardless of whether he is acting in a representative capac-
ity." 74
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 7 5 broadly empowers
the Commission to issue cease and desist orders to halt unfair methods
of competition and deceptive acts in commerce. This section has been
judicially interpreted to include the Sherman Act as well as the other
antitrust laws,76 and also encompasses conduct which amounts to less
than a violation of the antitrust laws but which is unfair competition. 77
With the American Cyanamid decision, the FTC has extended its
area of activity.78 The Court of Appeals was careful to provide that two
elements must be found before the FTC can take action. The Commis-
sion can explore the means and methods employed in obtaining patents
and the subsequent use of the patents.79 Because the FTC can condemn
conduct which amounts to less than violations of the antitrust laws it
could be argued that the mere existence of a fraudulent patent with its
power to exclude would violate Section 5. The Commission's latest
decision 80 does not reach this question because of the alternative nature
of the findings. It found that Pfizer had "failed to abide by the standards
of candor and good faith in procuring its patent," thus affirming its
original holding that Pfizer's conduct was inequitable. It held that
Pfizer's conduct during prosecution of the application and the sub-
sequent use of the patent to forestall competition amounted to a viola-
tion of Section 5.81 As an alternative holding it found Pfizer's conduct
to be clearly fraudulent and that Pfizer's subsequent use of the patent
was an attempt to monopolize in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act. 82 It remains to be seen if the FTC will generate any significant
74. Id. at 416.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
76. See, e.g., Atlantic Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 344 F.2d 599 (6th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 939 (1966).
77. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co.,
344 U.S. 392, 394-5 (1953).
78. See Comment, Improperly Procured Patents: FTC Jurisdiction and Remedial
Power, 77 HARV. L. RaV. 1505, 1511-15 (1964), for a discussion of the role of the Commis-
sion in such cases.
79. 363 F.2d at 772.
80. 3 CCH Trade Reg. 18,077, 20,504 (FTC 1967).
81. Id. at 20,519.
82. Id. The Commission reinstated its original order that Pfizer's patent must be
compulsorily licensed at a fixed royalty. Although it felt that Pfizer's conduct was such
that royalty-free licensing would not be unwarranted and that it had the authority to
order royalty-free licensing, the Commission stated that it did not want to inject such a
controversial point. This was because the Court of Appeals specifically said that it did
not hold that the Commission had the power to order royalty-free licensing, 363 F.2d
at 772.
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activity in the area of improperly procured patents, but its jurisdiction
in this area gives it a powerful deterrent force if it chooses to use it.
LIABILITY UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Perhaps the most awesome aspect of the antitrust laws is the mul-
tiplicity of suits to which a violator may be subjected. Given a violation
of the antitrust laws the violator faces: (1) criminal sanctions providing
for fine, imprisonment or both against the corporation, the individuals
involved and possibly the officers and directors of the corporation; 3 (2)
civil remedial action by the United States; 4 (3) private treble damage
suits by injured parties in which the record of the United States action
may be introduced by plaintiff to establish his prima facie case; s5 and,
(4) remedial action by the Federal Trade Commission.
Though not an antitrust violation, a patentee's fraudulent conduct
before the Patent Office does give rise to the application of the patent
misuse doctrine. This gives an infringer a defense to an infringement
suit. The defense is based upon the equitable "clean hands doctrine"
and precludes the patentee from enforcing his patent.8 6 In the situation
where the misuse arises out of fraudulent conduct during Patent Office
proceedings it could render the patent completely unenforceable,
because the patent might not have issued otherwise. It is both a deter-
rent to questionable conduct by a patentee and an effective remedial
weapon against a patentee who has engaged in such conduct.
Normal corporate patent procedure involves a contractual relation
providing that an employee-inventor must assign his interest in an
invention to the corporation and assist in the preparation of the patent
application and related documents. Assuming that an employee-in-
ventor and an employee-patent agent conspire to perpetrate a fraud on
the Patent Office as a result of which a patent is granted, what liability,
if any, is incurred by the actors under the antitrust laws?
83. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, & 24 (1964).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1964).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1964).
86. See, e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co.,
324 U.S. 806 (1945); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
For extended discussions, see, Greenberg, Unclean Hands As a Defense to Patent Infringe-
ment, 50 J.P.O.S. 12 (1968); Nicoson, Misuse of Misuse Doctrine in Infringement Suits,
9 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 76 (1962); Keaveney, Fraud in the Procurement As a Defense to
Infringement, 33 J.P.O.S. 482 (1951).
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Section 1 of the Sherman Act
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Nelson Radio and
Supply Co., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. a7 held that a corporation cannot
conspire with its officers or agents to violate Section 1, assuming that
the agents were acting within the normal scope of their activities. The
rationale for this holding is that an entity cannot conspire with itself
and a corporation can act only through its agents. This case has been
interpreted to preclude the existence of conspiracies between agents or
officers of the same corporation. 8 The justification for this interpreta-
tion is that were it otherwise, corporate officers could be in violation
of Section 1 for making everyday management decisions, e.g., agreeing
to establish the price of a new product. In terms of the hypothetical
posed then, there would be no liability imposed upon the corporation
or its employees under Section 1.189
While the position taken against the existence of conspiracies between
employees of a corporation correctly precludes liability in ordinary
business situations, it is submitted that it goes too far in that it covers
extraordinary situations as well. A position could be taken which would
recognize the existence of such conspiracies but which would define
"restraint of trade" in such a way as to exclude those activities normally
incident to the conduct of business. Given a conspiracy or combination
between officers of the same corporation, the inquiry would turn to
the reasonableness of the activity in which they were engaged to deter-
mine if the policy of the Sherman Act would be furthered by including
this activity within the definition of restraint of trade. Essentially, this
is a rule of reason approach.
Considering the hypothetical, the inquiry would be whether the
perpetration of a fraud on the Patent Office as a result of which a patent
grant was obtained was a restraint of trade which should be proscribed
by Sherman Act policy. The grant of a patent is the grant of the power
to exclude. It forecloses the area of activity covered by the patent claims
87. 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953); but cf., Patterson
v. United States, 222 F. 599 (6th Cir. 1915), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 635 (1915); White Bear
Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp., 129 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1942).
88. U.S. ATT'y GEN., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRusT
LAws, 31 (1955); Stengel, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 35 Miss. L.J, 5, 8 (1963).
89. A similar result would not necessarily follow if, an independent patent agent was
used by the corporation to prosecute patent applications. The patent agent could be
considered an independent third party and therefore capable of conspiring with the
corporation or its agents. The actors in both situations would still be subject to prose-
cution for falsely swearing before an agency of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964).
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to all except the patentee. Even though a patent issued through fraud
is void and unenforceable, until the fraud is exposed the existence of
the patent has the effect of stifling competitive activity. It is clear that
Sherman Act policy of fostering competition has been subverted and
that the act of obtaining a patent through fraud is a restraint of trade
within the meaning of the Act.
A source of difficulty with the proposed position is whether agents
of a corporation can conspire with each other. While it is true that the
acts of the agent are the acts of the principal, are they not individual
acts as well? If not, then a corporate officer or employee could never be
individually liable. But this is contrary to basic agency principles. The
tortious act of the agent subjects him to individual liability.90 His
principal is liable if the agent was acting within the normal scope of
his activity. Thus the conduct of an agent has a duality of aspect; the
authority to bind his principal and the ability to bind himself. Because
the act of an agent is his act, it would be possible to find that agents of
the same corporation can conspire with each other.
Using the foregoing approach within the terms of the hypothetical,
the patent agent and the inventor would be liable for a violation of
Section 1. While it is true that such a rule would lack clear definition
and be difficult to apply, it would better serve to effectuate both
patent policy and Sherman Act policy where extraordinary activities
are concerned. Such an approach with the consequent possibility of
liability would certainly serve as a deterrent without impairing the
normal function of business.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act
Given the hypothetical fact situation would there be any liability
under Section 2 for an attempt to monopolize? In Walker Process the
Court stated:
To establish monopolization or attempt to monopolize a part of
trade . . . it would . . . be necessary to appraise the exclusionary
power of the illegal patent claim in terms of the relevant market
for the product involved.Y1
From this language it would appear that the fraudulent procurement of
90. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 343 (1958).
91. 382 U.S. 172 at 177.
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a single patent would not be an attempt to monopolize. The inclusion
of attempt by the Court is unfortunate becase Walker asserted that
FMC had illegally monopolized. Monopolization and attempt to mo-
nopolize are separate offenses under Section 2 and while monopoly
power may be used to infer an intent and purpose to achieve it for an
attempt to monopolize,92 it is not a prerequisite to a finding of attempt."3
An examination of the elements of "attempt to monopolize" as ap-
plied to the hypothetical indicates that the fraudulent application for
a patent could be a violation of Section 2. As previously stated, an at-
tempt to monopolize requires a showing of specific intent, i.e., that the
actors involved intended to accomplish the result of monopolization. 94
In American Tobacco Co. v. United States,95 the Supreme Court indi-
cated that a monopoly need not result, but only that a dangerous prob-
ability that monopolization will result. Since the patent agent and the
inventor, in the hypothetical, intended the result that the Patent Office
issue a patent in reliance on the fraudulent application, the question
remains whether the issuance of a patent creates a sufficiently dangerous
probability of monopolization to violate Section 2.
In Walker Process, the Court declined to equate a patent with a
monopoly in the Section 2 sense but did not consider the probability
question. Since a patent is the grant of the power to exclude competi-
tion, it may properly be called a limited monopoly. A patent even
though fraudulent and unenforceable, nevertheless stands as a bar to
competition until the fraud is exposed. The actors are attempting to
carve out a sector of competitive activity and secure it through the
vehicle of a patent. Whether such activity creates a dangerous prob-
ability of monopolization resolves into a question of policy. Since both
Sherman Act and patent policy seek to foster competition it would
appear that proscribing such conduct under attempt to monopolize
would better effectuate this policy because the attempt to secure a
patent through fraud is clearly anti-competitive.
This approach would find an attempt to monopolize for the filing of
a fraudulent application. Thus the agent, the inventor, and the corpo-
ration would be subject to the criminal provisions of Section 2 and
92. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 154 (1951).
93. U.S. ATrY GEN., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMmITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAws, 61 (1955).
94. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948); Swift & Co. v. United States,
196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905).
95. 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946).
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civil remedial action by the United States or an injured party.9 6 It
would also serve as an added deterrent to such applications.9 7
Should a court feel constrained to inquire into economic considera-
tions and reject the foregoing approach, it is submitted that the claims
of some applications carry with them such economic potential as to
create a sufficiently dangerous probability of monopolization that they
violate Section 2. An excellent example is the tetracycline patent with
which the FTC was concerned in American Cyanamid. Tetracycline's
characteristics at the time of the application indicated superiority to
existing "wonder drugs." It later developed into an annual 100 million
dollar market. 9 If fraud in the application were exposed, this coupled
with its market potential would support a finding of a sufficiently
dangerous probability that monopolization would result to bring it
within attempt to monopolize.
Another approach would be to deny antitrust relief until the market
power of the patent could be assessed. This would require waiting
until a market was established and would enable the patentee to benefit
from his invalid patent, but it would conform to the literal language
of the Supreme Court in Walker Process.
The focus of inquiry has been a determination of what point in time
during the prosecution of a fraudulent patent application should
antitrust liability attach. The alternatives are essentially three: (1) upon
the filing of an application; (2) upon issuance of a patent, or; (3) after
the patent has established itself in the market. Although, the second al-
ternative, the issuance of a patent, has not been treated separately, what
has been developed concerning the first applies to it as well. The last,
waiting until a patent has become established in the market, would seem
the least satisfactory for it would allow the foreclosure of competition by
an invalid patent. While an injured competitor could recover treble
damages, assuming proof of the violation, he would be required to wait
thus denying him injunctive relief against potential injury. Either of
the former approaches would tend to halt anticompetitive activity at
its inception and promote both the Sherman Act and patent policy. A
competitor could get injunctive relief and eliminate potential injury
and would prevent a patentee from deriving any benefit from an in-
valid patent.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1964).
97. This would supplement existing criminal provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964).




Activities which come within the scope of the antitrust laws and
Federal Trade Commission Act arouse a formidable array of legal
tools which have the capability to criminally punish and civilly remedy.
Individual practitioners and corporate enterprises are well advised to
undertake to minimize activities which could lead to violations. Main-
tenance and improvement of existing high standards of patent practice;
periodic review of corporate policies and procedures with respect to
preparation and prosecution of patent applications, and; education of
personnel, reinforced through repetition, of the state of the law and of
the possible sanctions which could be imposed on individuals and
corporations are some preventive measures which can and should be
undertaken.
The thrust of the antitrust laws into the conduct of parties before the
Patent Office should give applicants and competitors alike pause for
consideration. While the questions raised the and hypotheticals posed
must await judicial determination, the potential impact of treble
damages, criminal prosecution, and the patent misuse doctrine should
certainly act as a serious impediment to even questionable conduct.
It deserves restating that what we have been considering is fraud.
Fraud by its very nature is intentional and wilful conduct. It does not
include good faith misrepresentations or those made through honest
mistake which would furnish a complete defense to an action of fraud
related to a violation of the antitrust laws.99
DENNIS P. MANKIN
99. 382 U.S. 172 at 177. The Court stated:
Good faith would furnish a complete defense. This includes an honest mistake as to
the effect of prior installation upon patentability-so-called "technical fraud."
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